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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 174 
Accident time: 10:55 Accident Date: 23/12/1996 
Where it occurred: Ou Andoung,  
Battambang Province 
Country: Cambodia 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Other Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: CMAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
incomplete detonation (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group operated in a two-man drill whereby one 
deminer used the detector and marked any signals while the other looked for tripwires, cut 
undergrowth and excavated any detector readings. A third deminer may have been resting [it 
is not known whether the group had changed from three-man to two-man teams at this time]. 
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No formal accident report was on record at the country MAC in January 1999. A short report 
on the accident written in Khmer was among the paperwork and the following summarises its 
content.  
The victim was told to get a marking stick by his supervisor. While he was doing so, he stood 
on the "booster" of a PMN-2 that had been "destroyed" on 20th December 1996. The "booster" 
had lain hidden in a clump of grass 2m (or 4m on an attached sketch-map) from where the 
mine was "destroyed". The "booster" left a crater of 10cm diameter x 5cm deep.  
[The PMN-2 booster is in a plastic well accessible from the underside of the mine. It is 
initiated by a detonator which must also have been in place. This implies that most of the 
lower half of the mine was in one piece after it had supposedly been destroyed.] 
A poor quality photograph of the victim's boot, some photographs of the accident site and a 
sketch map of the area were in the file. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 221 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 2 hours 5 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: not recorded 
 




See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A medical report recorded that the accident occurred at 10:55 and the victim arrived at 
Battambang Provincial Hospital at 13:00. The victim had a deep cut in the sole of his right foot 
measuring 1.5cm x 2cm x 1.7cm, a damaged toe, a superficial injury to his left shin 
(measuring 8cm x 6cm) and a deep cut on his right shin (measuring 7cm x 5cm x 1cm). The 
prognosis was that he would recover and go back to work. 
Failure to award compensation may be inferred from the absence of a record. The Victim’s 
return to work is inferred.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
supervisors failed to ensure that the device was properly destroyed or that the parts of a 
disrupted device were found and moved to the scrap area. 
This accident illustrates the dangers involved in destroying/deflagrating mines. The PMN-2 is 
constructed with its main charge in one half of the body of the mine: placing a charge against 
the other side is unlikely to cause a sympathetic detonation. 
If the mine had been detonated, the "booster" and detonator would have been initiated and no 
dangerous parts left. Complete deflagration achieves the same end. A plastic explosive 
2 
charge is much easier than TNT blocks to place in good contact with the side of the mine and 
so ensure a shock-wave transfer and a detonation of the mine. 
 
  
The HE in the PMN-2 is cast into one side of the mine, then it is usually lacquered. It is black 
in the picture above. 
The failure to ensure that the field supervisors and deminers knew how to destroy a PMN-2 
mine is an apparent failure of training. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.   
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